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This paper considers an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers, that leads to credit-rationing a proportion of borrowers.  However, in contrast 
to the existing literature, both firms and consumers in this model face borrowing constraints.   
Nonetheless, the borrowing constraints facing a firm and those encountered by a consumer have 
opposing effects on growth.  Relaxing borrowing constraints on firms is growth-promoting as more 
funds become available for productive investment.  In contrast, relaxing borrowing constraints facing 
consumers has a detrimental effect as funds are diverted from productive investment to consumption.  
Such an adverse effect offsets the externality effect present in the production function that would 
otherwise ensure perpetual growth. Furthermore, it is shown that the interaction between households’ 
and firms’ borrowing constraints may give rise to endogenous cycles. 
 
Resumo 
Este artigo considera um modelo de crescimento endógeno com informação assimétrica entre 
credores e devedores, a qual conduz a racionar o crédito a uma parte dos devedores. No entanto, em 
contraste com a literatura existente, tanto as empresas como as famílias enfrentam restrições ao 
crédito. De qualquer forma, as restrições ao crédito enfrentadas pelas empresas e pelas famílias têm 
efeitos opostos sobre o crescimento. Mitigar as restrições enfrentadas pelas empresas promove o 
crescimento pois mais fundos se tornam disponíveis para investimento produtivo. Em contraste, 
relaxar as restrições ao crédito enfrentadas pelas famílias tem efeitos negativos sobre o crescimento 
pois são desviados fundos de investimento produtivo para consumo. Este efeito adverso neutraliza o 
efeito de externalidade presente na função de produção que, na ausência de crédito ao consumo, 
asseguraria crescimento perpétuo. É também demonstrado que a interacção entre restrições ao crédito 
às famílias e às empresas pode dar origem a ciclos endógenos. The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, a number of studies have been proposed with the objective of 
evaluating the effects of borrowing constraints on economic growth.  Examples of such 
studies include De Gregorio (1993, 1996) and De Gregorio and Kim (2000).  These studies 
are of the view that borrowing constraints depress the accumulation of human and physical 
capital which drives economic growth.  In the above studies, however, agents are subjected to 
a borrowing constraint that has been imposed exogenously on them. 
In contrast, another field of research has proposed in recent years that it is possible to 
explain the origin of such borrowing constraints as an endogenous outcome of the economic 
environment.  According to this group of literature, informational asymmetry between lenders 
and borrowers in an economy gives rise to credit rationing.  In consequence, some economic 
agents become subjected to some form of borrowing constraints.  Additionally, these studies 
propose that the incidence of credit rationing hinders economic growth by way of creating 
friction in transferring funds between borrowers and lenders.  Examples of such research 
include Azariadis and Smith (1996), Bencivenga and Smith (1993), Bose and Cothren (1996, 
1997) and Ma and Smith (1996).  Further, these studies view financial development as 
occurring when forces from within, or from outside, the economy are able to mitigate the 
level of informational friction between borrowers and lenders, in such a way that firms gain 
more access to savings and are able to channel more resources to the productive use.  
With little exception, the focus of the above studies has always been on the 
borrowing constraint of the firms in an economy.  This is despite the fact that there exists a 
large volume of evidence suggesting the existence of borrowing constraints on consumers in 
an economy.  For example, Bayoumi (1993b), Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Sarno and The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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Taylor (1998) established that by including liquidity constraints
1 for the households, one was 
able to obtain better estimates for the consumption function.  Attanasio and Weber (1994) and 
Caporale and Williams (2001) have found that consumption functions that were developed in 
the 1980s under the assumption of perfect capital markets have failed to track the pattern of 
consumption behaviour, particularly for the United Kingdom, United States and Nordic 
countries.  Further, Koskela, Loikkanen and Virén (1992), Miles (1992) and Muelbauer and 
Murphy (1990) have identified the presence of borrowing constraints for mortgage credit and 
went on to investigate effects of borrowing constraints on housing demand and house prices.  
In the light of the above evidence that households, like firms, are also subjected to 
borrowing constraints, one is inclined to raise the following questions: (1) are these borrowing 
constraints influenced by the financial development in an economy? and, (2) what is the 
growth effect of relaxing these constraints?  Researchers generally answer the first question in 
an affirmative way.  It is generally believed that the financial liberalisation, which occurred in 
many industrialised countries during the 1980s, did relax the borrowing constraints facing the 
household, and gave rise to a consumption boom and a decrease in savings.  Based on this 
belief, many studies have included one or more proxy variables for financial deregulation 




In answering the second question, some researchers have expressed the view that 
opportunities for the households to finance consumption through borrowing remain limited in 
the presence of a borrowing constraint.  As a result, such borrowing constraints do promote 
                                                 
1 The role of financial deregulation is accounted for by allowing a fraction of consumers to be credit-constrained 
(defined as those whose consumption expenditures are entirely financed out of current income), and making that 
fraction vary with a proxy for financial deregulation. 
2 Bayoumi (1993a) finds that financial deregulation had a significant contribution in the decline of personal 
savings, whereas Bandiera et al (2000) do not obtain clear-cut results.  Nevertheless it is more supportive of a 
negative than a positive impact of the implementation of financial reforms on savings. 
3 Some of these studies further estimate the impact of financial deregulation on the responsiveness of savings to 
other variables (e.g. Bayoumi, 1993a).  Financial liberalisation is expected to increase the sensitivity of 
consumption to variables such as real interest rates and wealth since, when agents are not entirely free to borrow 
against future income, current income is almost the single determinant of consumption expenses. The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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savings in an economy; and by way of relaxing these constraints, financial development 
generates an adverse growth effect (Japelli and Pagano, 1994).   
Based on the above observations, it is then possible to identify two conflicting views 
regarding the effect of financial development on economic growth.  While one view suggests 
that financial development is able to generate positive growth effects by relaxing the 
borrowing constraints facing firms, the other view points to its detrimental growth effect that 
may arise as a result of relaxing the borrowing constraint of the households.  Surprisingly 
enough, no attempt has been made in the existing literature to consider both these two effects 
simultaneously while investigating the link between financial and economic development.  
The work in this paper aims to address this deficit in the literature.  
In doing so, I consider an overlapping generations model with an externality in the 
production function.  Borrowers in this model, in contrast to those in the existing literature, 
consist of both consumers and firms, and each group of borrowers face borrowing constraints 
that arise due to an informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.  Being 
endogenously determined, economic development causes both type of borrowing constraints 
to relax and give rise to two opposite growth effects.  On one hand, by relaxing a firm's 
borrowing constraint, more funds are made available for productive investments.  This effect 
is growth enhancing.  On the other hand, the household's borrowing constraint loosens up as 
its income increases along the path of economic development, causing diversion of resources 
from productive investment to consumption.  This creates a detrimental effect on economic 
growth.  In the presence of this adverse consumption effect, the economy looses the prospect 
of perpetual growth that is otherwise present in an endogenous growth model (AK model).   
In my model, the severity of the borrowing constraint facing households decreases 
along the path of economic development.  Therefore, it is possible that when the economy 
reaches a certain level of maturity, the volume of resources diverted towards consumption can 
be so large that the future capital stock available for productive purposes may actually The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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decrease relative to the current period.  This shrinkage of the economy, in turn, may tighten 
the borrowing constraint of the consumers in the following period and therefore may improve 
the growth prospect of the economy.  Such line of events raises the possibility of endogenous 
cycles.  In my analysis, it is possible to characterise the situations under which such cycles 
may arise.    The prospect that endogenous cycles may arise as result of an interaction 
between households' and firms' borrowing constraints is a consequence that has not been 
considered in the existing literature, and is one of the major contributions of this paper. The 
remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 offers a description of the model’s 
structure. In Section 2.3 I analyse the capital accumulation path for the economy and section 
2.4 concludes. 
 




In this paper, I present a model that is a modified version of that proposed by Bose 
and Cothren (1996, 1997).  A two periods overlapping generation model with zero population 
growth is considered, in which each young generation is viewed as a continuum of agents, 
half of whom are lenders and the other half are borrowers.  
Borrowers are not all alike, however. A group of young borrowers are divided into 
two categories – consumer-borrowers and firm-borrowers. This distinction has been made on 
the basis of the purpose for which a young borrower seeks external funding. For the sake of 
convenience, the mass of consumer-borrowers and firm-borrowers are each normalised to 
one.  Further, it is assumed that within each group, borrowers fall into two types: a high-risk 
type (type H) and a low risk type (type L).  A type H borrower has a higher probability of The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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default, and I assume that λ fraction of borrowers are of type H within each group of 
borrowers. 
 Each consumer-borrower has access to a home production technology that can either 
be run in the first, or the second period of his life.  By operating a home production 
technology in the first period of his life, a consumer-borrower is able to obtain 
,, ,
i iH L β = amount of output.  To ensure the single crossing property, I assume that β
L > β
H.  
Alternatively, if a consumer-borrower born at time t waits until his adulthood to run such 
technology, he is able to obtain a return that is proportionate to the market wage,  t w .
4  In 
particular, I assume that in such an event, a type i consumer borrower is able to obtain γwt 
volume of output with a probability p
i, where 0 < γ < 1, i = H, L, and 0 ≤ p
H < p
L ≤ 1.  With a 
probability, 1
i p − , this home production technology yields no return. Thus, there exists some 
externality from the market to the home production and it takes one period for such 
externality effect to trickle down.  A consumer-borrower is, however, interested only in his 
young age consumption. Hence, he may wish to run the home production during adulthood 
borrowing against adult income, since by doing that he is able to attain a higher level of 
consumption.  I assume that in an event in which credit is not granted, a consumer-borrower 
must run his home production while in the first period of his life in order to make resources 
available for consumption. 
While young, each firm-borrower is endowed with an investment project that is able 
to transform one unit of time t output into Q units of time t+1 capital, with  , ,
i p iH L =  
probability.
5  With a probability, 1
i p − , the investment project yields no return.  Young firm-
borrowers must resort to external finance to be able to run the investment project, as this 
group of agents do not have any source of income during the first period of their lives.   
                                                 
4 For the assumption that there is a productivity spillover from the market to the home production, see 
justification in Bose and Pereira, forthcoming. 
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Irrespective of the outcome of the investment project in the first period of his life, each firm-
borrower is able to produce output in his old age.  A firm-borrower is able to rent capital and 
hire labour at a competitively determined rental rate ρt+1  and wt, respectively.  Using 
k amount of capital and L amount of labour, an adult firm is able to produce output,  t y , 
according to the production function: 
θ θ α τ
− =
1
t t t L k y  (1) 
where τ represents the average capital stock per firm and, for simplicity, I assume α = 1-θ.  
Therefore, there exists an externality in the production function as in Romer (1986).  In 
addition, it is assumed that when credit is denied, a low risk (Type-L) firm-borrower is able to 
run a home production technology in the first period of his life, yielding β
L.  In contrast, 
however, no such outside opportunity is available for a high-risk firm-borrower.  
In this model, each young lender is endowed with one unit of labour that is supplied 
inelastically to the market for the competitively-determined wage rate, wt.  Each lender only 
values his old age consumption for which provision can be made in two ways.  Firstly, a 
lender is able to invest his earnings, t w , in a technology that yields Qε units of capital in 
period t+1 per unit invested in period t and rent this amount to firm-borrowers in his adult life.  
Alternatively, a young lender is able to lend his earnings to a borrower in return for a market-
determined interest rate.  It is assumed that ε is sufficiently smaller than p
H so that lending 
takes place.  Finally, I normalise the population of young lenders to 2.  In the next section the 
details of the credit market are presented. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 Denoting both consumers’ and firms’ probabilities of success by p
i is meant to economise on notation and does 
not have any implications in my results. The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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2.2. The Credit Market 
 
Although lenders can differentiate between a consumer-borrower and a firm-
borrower, both consumers’ types and firms’ types with regard to risk are private information.  
Under such circumstance, it is assumed that each lender offers a set of loan contracts and 
borrowers have complete knowledge about the types of loan contracts offered by each lender.  
If a lender’s contract is not dominated by those of any other lender, the lender is approached 
by a potential borrower.  I assume that each potential borrower can apply only to one lender.
6  
The credit market equilibrium at time t is defined to be a set of loan contracts such that there 
is no incentive for any lender to offer an alternative set of contracts, taking the rental rate of 
capital and the offers of other lenders as given.  Further, competition in the credit market is 
such that lenders earn zero economic profit on each contract.   
As is well known, in such a menu contract type of model, the only equilibrium that 
can exist is a separating equilibrium (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).  Further, in such 
equilibrium, separation between the borrowers is induced by offering the high-risk borrowers 
their first best contract and by offering low risk borrowers a contract that entails credit 
rationing a fraction of low-risk applicants.  Therefore, in equilibrium, the contracts take the 








j L R q C π + = , where
i
j q  denotes the loan amount, R 
i is the 
interest rate, π represents the probability of receiving loan, and j = c, f  represent consumer-
borrower and firm-borrower, respectively. 
It is easy to verify (following Bencivenga and Smith, 1993 and Bose and Cothren, 
1996,1997) that under the circumstance where, under competition, lenders are maximising the 
utility of the loan applicants, and when utility of an applicant is increasing in the loan amount, 
lenders would offer loan quantities to consumer-borrowers that are equivalent to the present 
                                                 
6 I make this assumption to bind the loan size in the presence of a linear technology of capital production. The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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. By a similar line of argument, it is easy to 
establish that 
i
ft qw = .  Furthermore, from the zero profit constraint of a lender, one is able to 
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, , , for high and low-risk firm-borrowers. In this model, the separation of 
borrowers is achieved by distorting the first best contract of the low risk borrowers, as a low 
risk borrower has no incentive to be considered as a high risk one.  Thus, each lender posts 
contracts 
H
c C and 
H
f C , which are the first best attainable contracts by a type H consumer-
borrower and by a type H firm-borrower, subject to the zero profit constraint of the lender.  In 
contrast, the lender must distort 
L
c C  and 
L
f C  contracts acceptable to low risk borrowers, in 
such a way that the type H consumer-borrower and type H firm-borrower are at least as well 
off as by accepting 
H
c C and 
H
f C  respectively.  Within my framework, this can be achieved by 
rationing a fraction of low risk borrowers in both groups.  To determine the optimal level of 
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In the above, equation (3) represents the utility of a type L consumer-borrower for 

















, , , whereas, the incentive compatibility constraints for 
high and low risk consumer-borrowers are given by equation (4) and (5), respectively.  Given 
that lenders are able to increase the low-risk consumer-borrowers’ utility by setting πct as high 
as possible, (4) must bind. Hence, the probability of low risk borrowers receiving credit is 














=  (6) 
Given p
L > p
H , it is easy to verify that πct < 1.  Furthermore, it should be noted that 








> , i = H, L.  These 
conditions imply that, both types of consumer-borrowers must be able to attain a higher level 
of consumption through borrowing against the second period income than what they can 
























= . The condition wt > wh ensures that πct > 0.  
Substituting the expression for πct from equation (6) into equation (5) it is easy to verify that 
the incentive compatibility constraint for the type-L borrower is satisfied.  Finally, I note that 




















ct  (7) 
Thus, an increase in consumer-borrowers' income relaxes constraints on consumption 
borrowing. 
Proceeding in a similar fashion, it is now possible to determine the optimal level of 
credit rationing to which a low risk firm-borrower will be subjected.  To find the optimal 
value for  ft π , I analyse the following problem for the lender: The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
G.E.M.F. –  F.E.U.C.  11
L




Q w p Max β π
ερ













































− + + H t t
L L











ρ π 1 1 ) 1 (  (10) 
As in the previous case, equation (8) denotes the utility of a low risk firm-borrower 












, , .  Equation (9) and (10) denote the incentive 
compatibility constraints for high and low risk firm-borrowers.  Since equation (9) binds, one 














   (11) 
The assumption ε < p
H  < p
L guarantees that 0 < πft < 1.  That the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the low risk borrower holds can easily be verified by substituting 
the expression for πft from equation (11) into equation (10). Finally it can be noted that the 







) ( ε ρ
β
.  In 
contrast, a high risk firm-borrower is always eager to participate in the market in the absence 
of any outside opportunity. 
 
3. Capital Dynamics  
 
In my model, the capital stock at  1 t +  comes from the successful, funded firm-
borrowers and from the lenders who converted their wages into capital after rationing the low 
risk consumer-borrowers and firm-borrowers.  The former amounts to The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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[ ]Q w p w p ft t
L
t
H π λ λ ) 1 ( − +  and the later corresponds to 



























− + − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 .  Given that all firm-
borrowers become output producers during their adulthood, per firm capital stock is given by: 
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Substituting (2), (6) and the expressions for the wage rates and the rental rates of 
capital (from equation 1),  t t k w
θ θ





1 2 t , into (12), and denoting 
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the capital accumulation path for my economy can be rewritten as: 














− − = 2 ) 1 (
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− − = 2 ) 1 (
L p l  and 
θ εθ β β
− = ′
1 2 Q . 
One may note that, in the absence of any consumer-borrowers, the capital 
accumulation path would be a linear function as would be obtained in a standard AK model.  
However, the presence of consumption loan diverts funds from a productive use, and 
therefore offsets the externality effect that is present in the output production function.  This 
effect is captured in the term Bktπc.  Further, a close inspection of (13) reveals that the capital 








k . Since the participation constraints on consumers and firms define the 

























and both kh and kl are larger than khl, only the segment of the function where kt > khl needs to The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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be considered. To obtain a deeper insight into the capital dynamics, its first and second 













































Over the domain of analysis, the second derivative is always positive. Therefore, the 
capital accumulation path is convex. Studying the first derivative I find that it decreases for 
values of khl < k < km and increases for values of k > km. The value of km can be calculated by 
setting the first derivative equal to zero. This gives: 






























− . Therefore, to ensure that 
there exists a steady state, one requires: 




B A  (17) 





















1  the steady state capital stock can be rewritten as: 
1 Ω = hl ss k k  (19) 
One may, however, recognise that the value of the steady state can be either greater 
or less than km, giving rise to two possible capital dynamics leading to the steady state. These 
two scenarios are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 (Appendix A).  In Figure 1, the case is shown The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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where km < kss, which corresponds to a smooth convergence to the steady state.  Figure 2 
corresponds to the case where the inequality holds in the reverse direction.  In such case, one 
observes volatility in the capital dynamics. Intuition underlying this cyclical behaviour is easy 
to understand.  Beyond a critical value of capital stock, the fraction of the loanable funds 





) 1 ( − + ) would exceed the fraction of the loanable 
funds channelled to investment ( ft π λ λ ) 1 ( − + ). This is so because the former is an increasing 
function of the wage rate, whereas the latter is a constant.  Suppose that the capital stock 
increases above such critical value.  In such a situation, the next period's capital stock would 
decrease.  This decrease in capital stock would depress the demand for consumption loans in 
the following period and more resources would become available for productive investment 
causing the capital to increase in that period.  This cyclical behaviour of capital stock will 
continue with decreasing amplitude until the capital stock converges to its steady state. In 
Appendix B, I  show that if condition (17) holds, there never exists a situation where such 
volatility may lead the economy to diverge from the steady state.  
To avoid the above scenario, one would require km < kss, (as shown in Fig. 2.1) which 
amounts to: 
1 2 1 > Ω − Ω = Ω  (20) 
Simple comparative statistics (see Appendix C) yield that an economy with more 
productive firms (high value of Q), will have higher chances of experiencing a smooth 
convergence to the steady state. A similar result is obtained for a high value of capital 
productivity (reflected by a high value of ρ ) in the output production function.  This can be 
verified by noting that Ω is increasing both in Q and in ρ: The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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In contrast, however, an increase in the productivity of home production technology 
is likely to make the economy more prone to cyclical fluctuation. This can be verified by 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In the existing literature, a large amount of attention has been devoted to 
understanding how financial development is able to promote economic growth by relaxing the 
borrowing constraint that firms encounter in a rudimentary state of financial development.  At 
the same time, economists have drawn attention to the fact that financial development may 
have a detrimental effect on growth performance since it diverts resources towards 
consumption by relaxing the borrowing constraint of households.  The objective of this paper 
has been to evaluate the link between financial development and economic growth while 
taking into consideration the above two effects simultaneously.  My analysis has shown that 
by way of relaxing the borrowing constraints of the households, financial development can 
offset the positive externality effects in a production function.  Further the presence of 
consumption loan may give rise to a situation in which an economy may periodically oscillate 
between good and bad outcomes on its way to the steady state.  Such volatility is more likely 
to be present, however, in economies that are less productive.  A certain or an unanticipated 
increase in future income is also able to render the capital dynamics more volatile. The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth   Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
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Appendix A: Smooth and volatile convergence 
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Appendix B: Proof of cyclical convergence 
 
In order to prove that in the scenario where km  >  kss convergence is a certain 
outcome, it is necessary to show that the capital accumulation path in the steady state is less 


























Manipulation of this expression gives: 
[] [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
2 2 < + − ′ − + − ′ + + − − B A k Bh l A k Bh l A l ss ss β β  
Next, substituting (18) in this inequality I obtain: 
   []
0 ) 1 (
) 1 (
) 1 ( 2
2
< + − ′ +
+ −







Finally, dropping the denominator, which can be done because setting it positive is 
equivalent to condition (17), and further manipulation leads to: 
0 ) 1 )( (
2 < + − − ′ B A l h B β  
This is always true since h < l, from p
H < p
L and 1-A+B > 0, from (17). 
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Appendix C: Determination of derivatives’ signs  
 
In order to know how the values of Q, ρ and γ influence condition (20), I calculate 
the derivative of Ω with respect to each of those parameters. 
a)  
Given that  0 2 ) 1 (
) (
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Since the sign of this expression is not identifiable, I substitute 
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Looking now at the derivative of Ω2 it is easy to see that it is negative: 
0
) (
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The sign of 
γ ∂
Ω ∂ 2 is straightforwardly identifiable: 
0
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